This is a theoretical preview from the perspective of a relatively objective fan of the club.  I hope to return to the tactical outlook of Chelsea latterly,  with more emphasis on how the theory worked out in practice,  how Mourinho and his coaching staff have implemented the general strategic framework they have imposed on the players:                                                                                            ……..

Previewing Chelsea tactically is a hard task. This seems a strange remark, given Mourinho’s rather obvious tactical framework. Yet, what we see when we look at Chelsea is potential for huge tactical diversity. What I aim to do in this preview is to bring out the key themes that I feel will bring Chelsea success this season, namely an the creation of numerical overloads on the left hand side, and use of a rotational trio in midfield and the potential of a higher defensive line. But we must first look back to last season, and explicate why, despite in many senses being vintage Mourinho, he failed to bring his club a trophy, despite being in the optimal position to do so on many occasions:

Part 1: Season 13/14; Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory:

Season 13/14 embodied a season unlike any Jose Mourinho season. He won no trophies.  But many things remained the same. First among these was his results against big teams, dropping only 2 points. What was so impressive about these results was as much to do with the variety of methods used to gain them. Against Arsenal and Liverpool at Stamford Bridge, intensive pressing and quick attacks started from high up the pitch was the chosen method, Oscar being particularly impressive in how studiously he pressed, while creating numerical overloads to the right hand side. Against City Home and Away, a deep defensive line was used, with attacks focused down the flanks, often with more fluidity than was often attributed to the club at the time. Hazard was immensely impressive in the latter match, drifting laterally from left to right , rarely being dispossessed, drawing men away from the likes of Ramires, Willian and Eto’o to find space inside the City area. The second City match was also characterized by lightening quick counter-attacks from interceptions very deep in the Chelsea half.   Mourinho’s strategy could hardly be called cautious, so much as highly based on transitional attack.    And against Arsenal at Home and Liverpool Away, it was described as parking the bus, unfairly so in the former case. Tactically it was defined by having a deep defensive line, a highly narrow set of midfielders, one of whom was allowed to break occasionally from the teams rigid structure. So, we see 16 points from 18, gained in three distinct ways; intense pressing and vertical passing, minimal pressing with counter-attacking based on dribbling from wide areas,   highly rigid defensive play, with space being left as teams become more desperate to break your team down, with substitutions being made to capitalize on the counter attack. This was the positive side of Chelsea’s 13/14 season, the negatives were rather different in nature.

What Mourinho needed to reverse were results against teams, particularly away from home, who were in the bottom half, and willing to sit ultra-deep,   while continually countering in wide areas. Chelsea’s problem here was three fold, a total lack of ambition in the passing from midfield a  set of strikers who thrive upon space behind defenders, while the one player capable of successfully attacking such a defense, Hazard, failed   to track back sufficiently diligently to prevent attacks down the Chelsea left (leading to Juanfran’s two assists at Stamford Bridge).

Ramires demonstrating Chelsea’s unambitious passing from deep.

This led to dropped points against the likes of West Brom,   Sunderland, Aston Villa, Norwich, West Ham and Crystal Palace, ultimately costing Chelsea the league title. The problem was arguably more pronounced against Atletico Madrid, whom they managed to take the lead against, yet lost 3-1, at no stage in the tie finding a way of attacking an ultra-well organized defense without compromising on defensive shape. As would be expected, Hazard’s defensive negligence cost Chelsea two goals in the tie, for failing to track Juanfran.

Season 2014/15:

I now talk about ways in which Mourinho seems to have sought to solve the problems. But since this is a tactical preview,   I first begin by defining what Mourinho has as an objective, which should allow more clarity in how he will attempt to resolve the problem, since any problem has multiple ways of being approached, it is your holistic objective which determintes how any problem should be approached,  and hopefully solved.

The objective:

Mourinho is commonly seemed to be defined by defensiveness. As I will say in later articles, this is both untrue and self manufactured by Mourinho. Instead it is pragmatism, and what he is doing in his long term vision at Chelsea is a highly pragmatic idea for his project at Chelsea,  the first team he has planned for the long term,  a team in which he has imposed his footballing ideology on to the largest extent of any of his previous teams.

‘The ideal is to play always in a high block, is to recover the ball very, very fast, is to have the ball and to build well, to have always a control of the game, to be proactive and not reactive . . . but the point is to have the ball possession but to use it in the proper way’

Mourinho; Sunday Night Football: 21/9/13; Post match interview vs Fulham H

In simplistic terms, this means a high defensive line, with pressing starting high up the pitch, to regain the ball, and exploit the defence when it is reorganising after losing the ball. The possession that results from winning the ball is not to be intrinsically cherished, but used to score as many goals as is possible.

The Solution:

The solution consists in new signings. But the new signings themselves change little, it is how they are being set up to interact with the existing players in the squad which forms the solution.

1. Diego Costa, and the left hand side overload.

Diego Costa is a very strange player. I confess to having not seen him too much, but when you watch him, it is a remarkable experience. There is a ruggedness to his game, a rawness that is surprising for a top level footballer. He relies on winning battles, he has an obvious determination to be better than his marker through sheer willpower. Yet he has an surprising turn of pace, a remarkable clinicalness in front of goal, movement that belies his image both on and off the ball. But he retains the intenseness in everything he does, intensely concentrated, very hard working when he presses the ball. He also holds the key to Mourinho tactically.

This is due to the liberating effect he will have on Eden Hazard. Contrary to popular opinion, Hazard actually underperformed last year. This may seem an odd statement, he was statistically effective, scored a fair few goals, was voted Chelsea player of the year, and widely seen to have carried the team. Yet, for the first 10 games he was average, Oscar was the star. Then Hazard came into his own, but got injured, and never really recovered. One reason for his (relative) ineffectiveness was a deprivation of space. Teams regularly put 3 men around his preferred space to the outer left of the D, from where he can dribble quickly towards goal, always ready to thread a pass through, or work a shooting opportunity. Hazard did well to escape this threat, drifting laterally, to especially good effect against City away, forcing men to come across and challenge him (he beat them) while also exposing the opposing team positionally. This however, blunts him, he is not natural goalscorer, and he gets forced sufficiently deep that a killer pass is not on. He is resorted to ambitious dribbles (which are more useful defensively than offensively), or conservative tempo maintaining passes. While opponents did this to Hazard, it was his own team who really inflicted the damage. Azpilicueta came inside, rather than outside Hazard, forcing Hazard to take the ball on the outside, never his strongest suit, especially against so many men, and with no-one attacking the box.  As importantly, Oscar’s preferred zone is to the right of centre,   Hazard’s to the left. This damages Hazard, who likes to play 1-2’s with a player moving across to him, as he cuts inside. (see his goal vs West Ham, from the right, or vs Sunderland, with Lampard from the left). Oscar also likes to drop deep to receive the ball, though often out of necessity, since the quality of the ball into attacking phases was so poor. Again, this further isolates Hazard, and allows triple marking to take place easily, teams who sit deep have no need to move up to press Oscar, and instead guard the space Hazard wants to move into. There is no threat from anywhere else, Ramires is hardly the person you need to close down, Lampard was (surprisingly) positionally disciplined, and lacks the ability to dictate tempo, or even hit accurate long passes. Nor would Torres run the left hand channel distracting opponents from Hazard, he like Oscar prefers the right-hand channel. This is not necessarily a reason for failure, a player can score in systems where most of the play takes place away from him, David Villa did exactly this in the 2010 world cup.   But when the player you are isolating is a)not an amazingly effective finisher, and b) your main creative outlet, the situation is far worse.

Norwich’s right side, 4 players around Hazard’s zone.

However, the situation has been solved, mainly by Costa. His favourite movement is to move in behind the space between Left and Left Centre back. Should the left back narrow up, Costa can run outside him, and retain possession with either Hazard or Filipe. This should give Hazard more opportunities to come infield. And thus more goalscoring potential. If the defense remain in a less compact state, Costa can receive through passes for 1 vs 1’s, something Costa thrives at. This ignores the vastly superior link-up play Costa offers, dropping deep at the right times to interact with attacking players in fast moves.   Exactly what Hazard requires to thrive. And this is nearly always to the left hand side. Filipe is a player who can certainly overlap, create chances, while not compromising defensive structure. Moreover, he may absolve Hazard of the need to transition back as quickly, since he presses better than either Cole or Azpilicueta. As a byproduct, it will also mean that Hazard gets more turnovers within his own half, giving Hazard more opportunity to drive at depleted defenses.  These points are all made generally, but apply especially well for teams of an ultra defensive mindset. To blockade Hazard now leaves the team open to having multiple players being beaten, with more players now in dangerous areas around him. Even if they insist on playing this way, there are now more players who Hazard can play 1-2’s with, or make distractionary movement for Hazard to exploit. Additionally, with Filipe now offering natural width, to play as narrowly as teams tended to is dangerous, Costa is no Drogba, but he can attack near post crosses effectively. This all fails to mention the possibility of quick switches of play to the right hand side, where Cesc Fabregas lurks, waiting to play a killer pass. To give him more space is suicidal.   This all ignores the obvious improvement caused by the sheer increase in quality that Costa offers over Ba, Eto’o and Torres.

The passes that Diego Costa received against Valencia 13/14. It demonstrates a clear left-side bias. HIs shots also came from a left hand sided position.

Filipe Luis’s passing chalkboard. It shows a tendency to make short passes infield from wide areas, and to hit near post crosses from advanced areas. If this trend continues, it indicates more natural width, conducive to giving Hazard more space.

2. Cesc Fabregas, Oscar and the flexible double pivot.

Cesc Fabregas immediately struck most people as an odd summer signing. A player who had spats with Mourinho, a spiritual successor (according to many mistaken individuals) to Xavi Hernandez. It was to me, immediately apparent what his role was. As has been mentioned, our major problem against ultra-conservative teams had much to do with a poor ball into the band of 3 behind Torres. Fabregas offers this in abundance. But it is more complex than this, since it is theoretically plausible for a team to man mark him, and continually press him. The solution has to do with the interaction between Matic, Oscar and Fabregas.

Oscar is a nominal number 10, but is a fundamentally defensive player. His role is to set the tempo of pressing. Last season he also played a pivotal role in ball regulation, dropping incredibly deep, often behind the double pivot, before moving forward into half-spaces to the right of centre. Matic was Chelsea’s usual holding midfield player, though this terminology denies the full extent of his role, he is far more box to box, winning the ball, advancing with it, and distributing it safely forwards. Fabregas, as we have just discussed is capable of dictating the entire tempo of a match,   but can also slip a killer ball through. What Mourinho has done, and aims to do, is create a rotational midfield, possibly to compensate for the lack of vertical runs inherent within a 4231. When Oscar comes short to receive, Fabregas will push on, Matic will offer himself as a passing option. Sometimes, one of the midfielders advance as a 3^rd man runner, knowing that Oscar will hold position if the move breaks down. This negates one of the more pressing criticisms of Chelsea’s move for Fabregas, his weak defensive transitions. If his movement forward is compensated by an Oscar movement backwards, in addition to Willian narrowing and tracking any full back runs, Fabregas is a minimal liability. Of course, in bigger games, the smallest of weaknesses can be exploited, so a 4-3-3, or more cautious 4-2-3-1 may be played.

But a rotational midfield, which offers makes Chelsea more unpredictable, is not the only thing that Fabregas offers. Against low blocks,   his contribution will be two fold. Firstly, his own passing range, and agility is such that he can directly open up a defense. Here, he serves the role of a Luka Modric, moving forward, always dictating the tempo, but also capable of escaping a heavy press through a little dribble to allow an attack to begin. But as importantly, is the liberating role he will give to Matic. At Benfica, he made his name at the base of a diamond midfield, being positionally disciplined, but also hitting moderate length passes out wide (especially to the left full back). At Chelsea, he could be pressed more easily, Ramires left free to make unambitious passes. With Fabregas, this is not the case. Most opponents will want to occupy Fabregas, perhaps leaving Matic free. This allows him to have acres of space, and plenty of time on the ball to play measured balls into dangerous areas. If opponents close down both, then they run the risk of an easy ball into Oscar or Hazard,   and compromising their defensive structure (for all but the best and most systemised pressing structures).   Or, you leave both free, and concede the game, and hope that Fabregas fails to play a killer pass for a match.

The rotational midfield trio. Oscar drifts more than the diagram suggests, off the ball it is far more solid (Oscar is always the highest in the defensive phase, offensive phase he comes deeper than Fabregas with regularity).

3. Kurt Zouma, John Terry and a transition to a Mourinho defense.

When Kurt Zouma came to the club,   I was very happy. Here was a young Centre-Back, very raw and but one who had been playing regularly for a Ligue 1 team. When someone that young gets so many games, it is presumably for his athleticism, only the greatest technical players stand out so early (one reason for Rooney’s early emergence was his sheer physicality, which was in stark contradiction with his age). Having seen him play during pre-season, this has only confirmed my initial thoughts. He is physically massive, yet quick over ground. He will win the majority of headers, aggressively tackle (sometimes cynically to prevent counters) he is capable of covering ground. He is wreckless, raw, technically deficient in touch and sustained dribbling. David Luiz, in the latter two senses, is everything that Zouma isn’t. But Mourinho’s purpose for Zouma is key, in the medium term, to creating a defence that is solid, high pressing, yet can accommodate John Terry.  Long term,  he may well be part of the replacement for him.

A fundamental deficiency in Gary Cahill’s game is his tendency to back off (see his awful attempt to prevent Manu Adebayor from scoring under Benitez). He often saves the day from last ditch clearances, admirable, except for the fact that Cahill’s error in anticipating danger caused the problem that he has to rescue. He is, as Michael Cox recognized when he was first purchased, a back-foot defender, a cover defender, great at seeing danger ahead of him,  pushing up to catch opponents offside. The problem is, that this relies on a quick, aggressive partner to thwart attacks, with yourself taking good covering positions, and stepping up when necessary. This caused two problems initially. a) Chelsea’s club captain happened to be good as exactly this cover role, and mediocre stepping up and being aggressive due to his lack of pace, b) David Luiz fulfilled all of the former functions, but lacked consistency,. There was a 3^rd problem, Cahill wasn’t very good at the role. When combined (as he regularly was) with Luiz, Luiz stepped up, Cahill dropped back, and there was a resulting ocean of space, particularly with full backs who were particularly energetic going forward.   Cavani, Rooney and co exploited this to the full in games against Chelsea. When deep defence was required, this was ok, Cahill and Luiz both have qualities in last ditch defending, they are brave, positionally decent for blocking, fairly good at marking of players, and were incredibly well protected. But when asked to play proactively, the same old issues surfaced. This season, Cahill and Terry, the preferred partnership, universally impressed and Cahill in particular improved, partially because of his partners widely acknowledged organizational capacity. This improvement lasted even when playing a D-line that was not deep, he stopped backing off so regularly. But this was partially because of Terry’s instruction, as well as coaching, presumably.

What Chelsea have in Zouma is someone who naturally tends towards the game that we are coaching Cahill into, only younger, physically developed, with room to learn the game tactically perfectly, and who is apt enough at the more basic defensive arts that he can play deep. He can become the Terry of early years, proactively snuffing out attacks, with a more reactionary defender behind him.  This season,  he will be comparatively insignificant,  3rd choice CB at best.  But in the future he can both complement and replace Terry.

4.  Return of the King; Didier Drogba and Chelsea’s plan B:

The man who brought Chelsea the Champions League trophy is back.  This time Drogba will play an auxiliary,  but no less important role.  Previously,  his main asset was his sheer physicality,  being quick enough to sprint behind opposing defences,  yet strong enough to win aimless lumps up to him.  His technical skills,  though deficient in some key areas (dribbling,  his first touch) developed to be sufficiently good to bring midfield runners into play.  His possession of a fierce strike from distance helped to unlock low block defences,  as did his quite superb ability to head the ball (people always talk about that goal in Munich,  I think of a very different goal in Munich). Most of these things have been diminished,  certainly his physical skills.  But,  with rest,  he can perform one vital function for Chelsea,  he can act as a defensive target man.  Before I explain how,  we should first define the position.  A target man,  in common football parlance,  is a striker designed to be the focal point of attacks,  often directed to his head.  My use of the word defensive is merely a reference to how I suspect he will be used.  He will come on with 20 minutes to go,  against teams who may be a counter-attacking threat,  to a) defend set pieces) but more importantly b)win balls in the air that are put up to him,  and begin to attack from here.   This is especially useful when considering the increasing emphasis on pressing in football,  you cannot press a ball in the air,  and when you have someone as effective as Drogba receiving it,  a wasted ball possession is far less likely.  So against teams like Everton,  Tottenham (assuming a Pochettino pressing spree),  Southampton (presuming the press continues),  he is a useful weapon for initiating attacks against very heavy pressing that Chelsea will struggle to pass around.  Even a footballing purist such as Guardiola did this against Dortmund.  A pragmatist such as Mourinho will surely have thought of this possible useage of Drogba before signing him.  In addition,  in games in which Chelsea fall behind (and need to win) his still formidible physical strength could quite easily be used in a 352/343 hybrid system,  something Mourinho utilised on various occasions when chasing games last season (and at Real Madrid).

5.

So, how will they line up:

From this,  we can now create some hypothetical formations and line-ups.

1.

A default line up against most opponents.

This line-up has already been explained above,  a controlling,  fluid,  left side dominant formation designed to make optimal use of Fabregas,  Hazard and Costa.

2.

Potential line-up against “bigger” domestic teams:

A slightly different system,  with at least one more narrow midfielder.  Less fluidity,  and more counter-attacking (hence Willian’s inclusion,  a more direct player who enjoys running at players).

3.

A 433 for Europe:

Matic could feasibly move forward to replace Ramires (who could in turn replace Schurrle) opening a space for Mikel to come in with an ultra-defensive version.

Midfield superiority is often the way to win in Europe.  This is a highly counter-attacking formation,  designed to press (but with more solidity),  offer width without compromising team shape,  and offer some more typical English physicality that defines Mourinho teams,  especially against teams less susceptible to physical,  direct play.

Conclusion:

Chelsea have by far the most varied attacking weapons in the league,  many of whom I have not talked of directly.  They have a manager capable of organising a highly organised defensive unit,  a fluid midfield trio capable of combining verticality,  control and organisation.  An offensive line that now effectively combines,  rather than restricts,  its’ most important offensive weapon.  They perhaps lack some of the typical Mourinho physicality,  but this team make up for it in variety,  astuteness,   technical and tactical intelligence  while not lacking any of the mental or physical endurance.  They have also retained,  in players like Mikel,  Ramires,  Willian,  Schurrle,  players who suit a particular tactical framework,  while not being out of place in the holistic structure.  These players are especially useful in big games when the objective is attacking space in behind defenders from deep positions.  All this would make it a surprise if Chelsea failed to make the top 2,  a moderate surprise if they fail to win the league,  judging by Mourinho’s track record of success.

OW,  21/8/14

Man Utd vs Swansea:

• The exaggerated talk of Man Utd’s ills is quite unreal.  They had many injuries,  in key positions when you play a back 3.  Add Shaw, (potentially Rojo as a LCB),  Valencia and Van Persie (perhaps with another more combative central midfield player),  and the squad looks far better.
• Tactically,  the back 3 functioned interestingly.  Smalling was in the centre,  but seemed unwilling to track Bony up the pitch (perhaps being told to sweep behind).  Jones as the RCB made sense,  he played out fairly well,  and is mobile enough to cover RB spot. Blackett made several costly errors.  For the first goal,  he got dragged across far too early in the move,  Smalling had to cover late,  meaning no-one could close the late run of Ki.  Darren Fletcher was conspicuous by his absence in this case, Utd in general failed to press the ball high,  nor drop into a compact enough shape.

• Rooney’s free-kick was so nearly wonderful,  not his usual kind,  which usually possess a vicious spin across goal,  this was a far quicker effort which was unstoppable.

• I think the defence misses Jonny Evans (a player I have a dislike for,   mainly based on his penchant for thuggery),  but he does possess genuinely good anticipation of moves,  in a way that I doubt Smalling will ever develop.

• Lingard’s crossing was genuinely appalling throughout his brief appearance,  couldn’t do it on the run,  it seemed.
• Montero was a really clever substitution,  get wide of a non-natural full back and whip a ball to the far post.  Looked highly impressive,  though likely to be inconsistent,  wide players of his ilk can easily be squeezed out of the game, and his end product looked poor throughout (you won’t see many defenders misjudging aerial balls as badly as Young did). Shelvey really likes playing direct balls from deep.  Unsure of the value they possess,  to be honest. Swansea are really lucky to have two strikers of similar style in Gomis and Bony,  both of whom will score goals given a sufficiently direct supply line.

West Ham vs Tottenham:

• West Ham caused Spurs all sorts of problems from corners.  Doesn’t surprise me,  very little height in Tottenham’s team,  Adebayor, Kaboul and Capoue the best in the air.
• Eriksen and Lamela got a surprising attack on MoTD.  Personally thought it was harsh  on Eriksen,  whose final ball was somewhat off,  but his movement into either half space was superb.  Always feel that Adebayor isn’t the striker to make runs in behind though,  seems redundant currently.
• Lamela has superb ball skills,  do wonder about how deep he is receiving the ball though.  His only successful dribbles were deep inside his own half,  which isn’t really how he wants to play.

• Absolutely no penetration from Tottenham,  no movements in behind,  especially with Lamela nominally behind the strikers.  Would like to see him start as the identifiable inside right,  could offer some shooting from better areas. Pochettino has real depth in the midfield.
• I do wonder when the high pressing game will begin to be implemented,   perhaps when Paulinho comes in.  He has the natural energy to suit Pochettino.  Perhaps alongside Bentaleb,  perhaps Capoue.  Can’t see Dembele being suited,  Sandro is good in very specific circumstances.
• Talking of the pressing,  it was totally absent.  You feel that quicker it comes in the better,  getting Lamela and Eriksen more turnovers is key.  Problem is,  will Lamela be willing to press as high,  will Eriksen by capable of it (you would hope so,  he played for Ajax).Worth noting that Lamela made his name at Roma under Zemen,  whose brand of relentless,  direct and highly open football suited him,  gave him ample opportunity to run at defenders.  Pochettino should be good for him for this,  he is no possession freak,  and likes direct wide attacking players.

• I don’t agree with Sam Allardyce often,  but he was right to say Kouyate was brilliant,  One sloppy pass out from the back,  kept it simple,  won the tackles he needed to.  My worry is about the players ahead of him; Cole,  Nolan, Downing and Vaz Te  don’t exactly inspire confidence.  Enner Valencia has much pressure upon him.

• The diagrams for passes received and for passed completed are very interesting in this match. Eriksen received most of his passes in the right of centre zone,  playing as a narrow right sided player,  often interacting with Lamela,  who received the ball predominantly in the central areas,  but also in a right sided position,  always receiving the ball from a player in a central position (unlike Eriksen,  whose passes came from the right side (perhaps an indication of the positional changes that  after the sending off)). Lennon  despite playing on his wrong side,  received all of his passes in more natural wide areas. Eriksen’s passes made chart shows most passes being made infield,  with many more direct attempts at killer balls,  nearly all of the failing. Lamela was not involved,  made only 25 passes,  misplaced several of them,  including a square pass inside his own half.

See all the chalkboards at:  http://www.fourfourtwo.com/statszone/8-2014/matches/755312/summary#tabs-wrapper-anchor

Match of the Day:

• Having Shearer and Gullit in the same studio really doesn’t work.  They still have animosity towards each-other,  while allowing Shearer to attempt a tactical analysis (which he did wholly unsuccessfully) just seems wrong.  Ruud just seems to make points about passion,  with no real insight.

• Van Aanholt really switched off for Sunderland,  let Berahino run off him.  Not the first time,  he did it for Chelsea in a CC match vs Newcastle,  and is generally positionally awful.  He did however,  contribute a much needed burst of verticality for the 2nd goal,  great spot from Gomez,  good cut-back,  Larsson demonstrating his technical proficiency with a nice side-footed finish.

• McGeady’s goal has to be one of my favourite kinds,  the hard hit slow curler that just clips the inside of the post,  wonderful finish from a highly talented (yet disturbingly one dimensional) player.

OW, 16/8/14

With a virtuoso display of finishing in Salvador, the Dutch chastened a Spanish side indelibly influenced by their own footballing past – and by their current manager                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Although it is tempting to view any successful team, particularly any international team, as causa sui – as a product of its own footballing culture and nothing else – the reality is that successful teams have always looked abroad for inspiration. Perhaps, in part, this is simply down to the natural allure and exoticism of that which is foreign. Just as the hosting of this World Cup in Brazil possesses a romantic appeal arguably unmatched by any country closer to home; perhaps even England itself; it is worth remembering, conversely, how top Brazilian sides such as Corinthians, Arsenal and Sao Paulo Athletic Club self-consciously retain their original English monikers, in testament to their English origins.

Indeed, for all that Brazil’s playing style can be considered originally and organically Brazilian, the individual dribbling so characteristic of jogo bonito was a distinctly English tactic when football was famously established in Brazil by nimble winger-cum-railwayman Charles Miller, a well-to-do Englishman of Scottish descent who took it upon himself to act as a sort of footballing missionary across the South Atlantic. The game Miller preached was based first-and-foremost on individual dribbling; dribbling he had honed on the pitches of the public schools that, unsurprisingly, valued the assertion of individuality above just about all else. Even that most revered and romanticized of footballing styles, therefore, can be said to ultimately originate not on the sandy beaches or narrow streets of Brazil itself, as might be imagined, but under the drizzly skies of nineteenth-century public-school England, some six thousand miles away.

By the very same token, the responsibility Spain possesses for tiki taka, the possession-based style so imperiously successful prior to the interventions of Arjen Robben, Robin Van Persie and co. yesterday, doesn’t lie solely with the Spanish. The twist here, however – a twist of which Mary Shelley, author of Frankenstein, would be proud – is that the team who so emphatically ended Spain’s tiki taka reign yesterday represent the very nation who can claim to be the forerunners of tiki taka itself. For just as, in Shelley’s gothic novel, Victor Frankenstein eventually manages to destroy the immensely powerful monster which he, many years before, had created; so Holland destroyed a Spain team yesterday whose very blueprint for such immense prior success as winning every tournament since 2008 – tiki taka – has historically been developed by the glow of Dutch, and not Spanish, candlelight.

The early phase of tiki taka’s development belongs to a name familiar to football fans everywhere: Johan Cruyff, inspiration, ideologue and all-round icon of Dutch football, if not world football, in the 1970s. At Ajax, Cruyff acted as the keystone of a side who bewitched European audiences with a brand of football based around one essential – namely, the ball itself. More precisely, both the retention of and the regaining of the ball were upheld as sacrosanct, with Cruyff, at the prerogative of his manager Rinus Michels, actively enforcing these dual principles on the pitch. However, to the extent that this can truly be gauged, it is fair to say that the principles were really Cruyff’s, and not Michels’s, or at least became Cruyff’s. The lengths to which Cruyff cajoled and criticized team-mates for ball-related mistakes simply seems too great to fall within the scope of mere subservience to managerial prerogative.

For Cruyff, football based on retaining and regaining possession wasn’t simply preferable in aesthetic terms. It was, more importantly, the most efficient way to play football; to fail at either was, therefore, to do nothing less than harm your team’s chances of the best possible result. Famously, Cruyff once even criticized his Ajax team mates for scoring a goal, arguing it should have been scored earlier in the play. To criticize a misplaced pass is one thing, but to criticize a goal for its perceived inefficiency suggests a genuine personal belief on Cruyff’s part that Michels’s footballing principles were right. What kind of manager, after all, would actually encourage his or her captain to criticize goals? Not Michels. No, the one who truly enshrined in footballing scripture the principles of retaining and regaining the ball was Cruyff himself. Scripture which, as his indefatigable personality might suggest, he was prepared to preach as far and wide as possible.

Hence, when Cruyff eventually retired from playing in 1984, ending a dazzling career which contrived merely to harden his footballing principles, coaching and instilling these principles seemed the only realistic option. Deeply influenced by his spells at Ajax, and later FC Barcelona, Cruyff proposed that a copy of Ajax’s academy (of which he and many of his 1970s teammates were highly successful products) be set up at Barcelona, a proposal gamely accepted by then-club president Josep Lluis Nunez. The result was La Masia, or ‘The Farmhouse’, a proving ground nestled amongst traditional Catalan idyll, but which practised very Dutch, and very demanding, training methods. That being said, winning among younger age groups was never prized, with younger Barcelona age-group teams frequently losing to equivalent sides from smaller clubs. All the value lay in the ball, as Cruyff would have it, training sessions peppered with constant games of rondo, or ‘keep ball’ (indeed, the very name ‘tiki taka’is said to simply derive from the sound the ball makes when passed first-time between teammates). Losing the ball, as well as failure to regain it quickly enough, were the true losses.

Amongst the first crop of youngsters to graduate from La Masia was one Pep Guardiola, who emerged when Cruyff himself was Barcelona manager. Indeed, were it not for Cruyff’s direct intervention during Guardiola’s very first week at La Masia aged 13, Guardiola would never have become the pass-master so pivotal (both metaphorically and positionally) to Barcelona’s style in the ‘90s, and to their astonishing later success under his management. Cruyff explicitly requested during a youth team game that youth team coach Charly Rexach switch Guardiola from the right of midfield to a ‘pivot’ role in the centre, from which he could best utilize his obvious awareness and technique; a role which Guardiola never left at Barca until 2001, some 17 years later. Naturally, with Guardiola having helped secure Barca 16 trophies during his career and with his star beginning to wane, the Barcelona manager at the turn of the century actively nurtured a successor: the great Xavi Hernandez, arguably the single most important player behind Spain’s recent dominance, and the player most emblematic of their tiki taka style.

So who was the Barcelona manager at the time? Answer: none other than Louis Van Gaal, the very same Dutchman (minus the receding hairline) who oversaw Spain’s humbling yesterday in Salvador. Louis Van Gaal, the man who also brought Andres Iniesta from La Masia to the Barca first team and onto World Cup-winning superstardom with La Roja. Louis Van Gaal, the man who yesterday conspired to kill off – possibly for good – the footballing behemoth which he and his fellow Dutchmen have largely served to create. Louis Van Gaal – the man who yesterday imbued a football match with a Shelley-esque literary resonance the likes of which we may never see again.

CW, 14/6/14

For all that world football lauds, and rightly so, the astounding twin talents of Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo, neither of those two quite justify the epithet “changed football” in the same way as Xavi Hernandez, Barcelona and Spain’s favourite eldest son                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

Xavi’s peerless ability to keep the ball, with his possession statistics rarely ever below ninety percent at any level of competition, served quite simply to starve all opposition; to weary them so much that when they did steal it back, exhaustion and panic contrived for them to hand it back once more, and allow Xavi to initiate what Sir Alex Ferguson famously described as the passing “carousel” all over again.

Some were critical, and found the ‘carousel’ which revolved around Xavi not the fairground fun it sounds, but rather, ‘boring’. It is worth noting, however, that this criticism reached its zenith when Spain and Barcelona were at their most successful, during 2011 and 2012; something which testifies to the sheer success of the Xavi blueprint as much as it serves to highlight the brazen desire for constant obvious ‘action’ and ‘drama’ among many football fans.

To lay out the blueprint further: it is the sheer range of qualities needed to keep the ball as well Xavi does which truly serves to astonish. Vision is the obvious one. But also, two footedness, supreme technique in striking the ball (even for the innumerable five-yard passes so apparently effortless), a first touch which doesn’t simply control the ball, but positions it in such a way that the consequent pass is as simple to execute as possible, physical stamina, spatial awareness, anticipation of others’ movements, confidence in always demanding the ball, whatever the situation, clear and quick communication with team-mates regarding space (or lack of it), and perhaps above all in today’s hyper-athletic game, the ability to consistently “find space” – the quality which Xavi himself defines his game by.

Xavi mastered them all, and for all some fans may justifiably claim his style lacked the all-action, goal-laden qualities of Ronaldo and co., the fact remains that footballers the world over are now very much disciples of Hernandez’s way.

CW, 12/08/14

Tiki-Taka could only survive with Xavi,  its’ death is therefore his greatest legacy (and what enabled him to be great)

Attempting to reflect on a man whose career is still active is a difficult task,  many eulogies have been written prematurely,  excluding one last triumph.  From the tennis world,  Pete Sampras would be the ideal example,  Zidane would have been another,  but for his infamous headbutt on Materazzi.   Fortunately,  we are aware that Xavi will have no last hurrah on the international stage,  retiring after 133 caps for his country.

His legacy is summed up by the ideology to which he was central,  tiki-taka.  Indeed  this will be the central lens through which he will be remembered,  as the consistently moving,  forever thinking,  persistently circulating midfielder of the most successful International team ever,  and of Barcelona’s greatest team.  This is quite right,  his qualities,  both on the ball (his assist totals were  remarkable),  his touch,  the intelligence with which he selected the pass to play.  As important was his movement after he made the pass,  the way in which he constantly moved into the correct place to receive the ball again.  So much of what he did was so simple to do,  but when it is done consistently correctly,  it becomes a perfectly perfected art.  This is not to talk about the difficult things that he is expert at,  so much so that he makes them look easy.  His drifting long passes to the flanks,  his incredible touch,  letting players think they can take the ball of his toes,  then touching the ball around them,  exploiting the space behind them.  Nor was he merely a silky playmaker,  he ran more than any other player in Barcelona’s team.

But to view Xavi through the lens of tiki-taka is not the most provocative way of looking at him.  To analyse Xavi though his contribution to Tiki-Taka runs the risk of forgetting that he was age 28 when he won Euro 2008.  He had the supposed ‘prime’ of a players career behind him.  It is runs the risk of forgetting that until 2008,  he had not been radically successful,  nor recognized by public opinion as an incredible player.  Indeed,  that most successful of indicators of public opinion,  the Daily Mail,  believed he was overrated for quite some time.  To view him purely through the prism of his successes also makes you forget how peripheral Xavi was at times before 2007,  he failed to start the Champions League final of 2006,  selling him was investigated as a genuine possibility in 2004,  at the same time as physical midfields such as those found at Chelsea were prevalent.  Indeed,  in the Champions League tie between the two in 2004,  he was dispossessed by Lampard in the build up for Gudjohnsen’s opener.  Deco,  Ronaldinho,  Van Bommel,  Marquez and (surprisingly) Edmilson were more important for Barcelona,  certainly in Europe.   For Spain,  it was the arrival of Marcos Senna that was typified as allowing Spain to work,  for allowing Xavi to dictate games without exposing the structure of his team,  or being overrun in midfield.  Yaya Toure supposedly fulfilled a similar function for Barcelona in 2009.

Yet taking this perspective is also narrow,  for his early career was defined by  the same astute passing and moving that came to become predominant in his career,  seen early by a man good at nurturing young talent,  Van Gaal.  He was the replacement of Guardiola,  later to be his greatest manager.

Perhaps the best way of reflecting on Xavi is to view the teams in which he played,  for this is the only way of gauging his influence upon them.  The early Van Gaal team was one based around passing,  moving,  absurd amounts of possession,  width.  He was integral,  but very deep,  the Busquets role in Guardiola’s philosophy,  though he was closer in style to Schweinsteiger this summer.  The team failed,  and was reconstructed.  In this reconstructed team of Rjikaard,  he was peripheral,  his lack of physique mistrusted wherever it could be exploited.  His impact is defined almost by the identifiable lack of flaws he displayed,  with Xavi,  his flaws (physically weak and unimposing,  his inability to shoot effectively) only emerge if he is actually influential (how can your bad shooting be exposed if you don’t horde the ball,  how can your susceptibility to aggressive physical challenge be displayed if you don’t possess it as much).   As his career reached its’ peak under Guardiola,  based around everything Xavi stands for,  short passing,  dictation of tempo,  control of the ball and space,  defending through pressing,  not challenging,  he became integral,  indeed,  he came to define the team. He was central to everything.  It was Xavi who put in the wonderful ball for Messi’s header in the Champions League final of 2009, consistently assisted the most goals for Barcelona,  controlled every single match,  domestic,  continental and international.   All these facts omit his influence over the clasico,  which he dominated for 4 successive years.  For Spain,  he dominated 2 international tournaments,  and even in his quietest (Euro 2012),  he was the most effective player in the final.  His incredible qualities effectively made Spain and Barcelona great.

Perhaps the biggest compliment that Xavi can be given is that it was he who allowed (and forced) Tiki-Taka to emerge.  Its’ dominance only ended when he entered decline.

OW, 12/08/14

When we finalise the date,  we will comment below.

For all that Sir Alex Ferguson’s hand-picking David Moyes as his successor at Manchester United has come to be regarded by footballing consensus as a serious error of judgment, there remains another judgment of his which, for all its controversy, becomes ever more convincing viewed in the golden glow of this Brazilian World Cup. For all his undeniable skill, Ferguson simply asserted, in terms the simplicity of which perhaps takes the controversy to even greater heights, that England’s captain Steven Gerrard is not a “top, top” player. Now, of course, it is possible to sidestep this claim entirely by claiming that footballing vocabulary lacks any sort of precision; that linguistic judgements on its clichéd terms are necessarily vague. Granted, “top, top” is, taken on its own, a pretty meaningless adjective, bereft of any genuine descriptive or categorical power. Yet, in the context of Ferguson’s other references to Gerrard, Gerrard’s career, and most immediately, Gerrard’s performances in Brazil, the meaning becomes clearer than any amount of linguistic pedantry can deny.

When the stage is set sufficiently high, Ferguson means, Gerrard falls off it. Further, he does not simply fall off it, but runs, in a manner which, although not deliberate, is borne out of an attitude which always tends towards self-destruction. When television replays showed Luis Suarez baring down on Joe Hart’s goal, about to score a winning goal assisted solely by a Uruguay goal kick and by a Gerrard header, the decision to leave Gerrard within the camera’s scope was telling. There was no head in hands, no looking away, no sign even of that prodigiously lined grimace which seems to emerge whenever Gerrard plays in the white of England. Instead, there was an expression of mere blankness etched on his face, as if he had somehow expected to orchestrate a decisive moment of implosion in Sao Paulo no less than he expected to hear ‘God Save the Queen’ played before kick-off.

Of course, any keen follower of the English game knows that Gerrard’s career is stained with these moments; enough of them that it may well not seem so odd to see Gerrard emotionally unmoved seconds before Suarez applied his coup-de-grace. His misplaced back-pass to Thierry Henry virtually ten years to the day at Euro 2004 handed France opening-game victory, where victory had ben England’s only minutes earlier. His own-goal against Chelsea in the 2005 League Cup final proved the winner, for Chelsea. His slip against the same club which arguably cost Liverpool the league title Gerrard himself has so openly craved, and which, to much internet mirth, imbued the otherwise tired footballing cliché of the ‘fall guy’ with surprising substance. And, of course, his header on Thursday landed, an occurrence lashed with irony, at the feet of his club mate Luis Suarez. Yet to infer from his blank expression from that Gerrard was not at least partially responsible for the assist, and not aware of such responsibility, would be just as grave an error of judgment as picking Moyes was by Ferguson. More specifically, it would be to ignore a fundamentally self-destructive element to Gerrard’s footballing attitude; one which accounts significantly for these moments, even if bad luck undeniably remains a factor behind them.

One can easily make the case in all four instances, on the basis of empirical observation alone, that such errors stem from trying to do too much: in every case, Gerrard adopts the position of a central defender with defenders nevertheless present, taking up a mantle which, tactically and positionally speaking, really doesn’t need taking up at all. In Sao Paulo yesterday, Gerrard’s retreating to head the ball ensured he could only glance it backwards, when Phil Jagielka was far better primed to run onto the ball and make solid contact. Hence, as Jagielka moved forward to attack the ball, Gerrard’s unnecessary retreating left Jagielka horribly out of position, exposing space which Gerrard’s consequent header, coupled with Luis Suarez, served to occupy. Yet this Roy-of-the-Rovers attitude apparently underlying such moments only becomes truly worthy of the label ‘self-destructive’ when one views them in the context of Gerrard’s own, self-professed, psychology.

In his autobiography, Gerrard talks of a constant desire not to “let people down”, something apparent from as far back as his pre-teenage years. Furthermore, and of more immediate relevance to the Suarez error, Gerrard gave a team-talk mere days before Thursday’s game where he warned his team-mates of the “terrible, long summer” they would endure were they to lose and be eliminated. Hence, the apparent desire to bear the burden of responsibility on the pitch in crunch games seems authentic: Gerrard really does feel significantly more responsible than he considers his team-mates – Phil Jagielka included – to be, and, further, really is burdened by such responsibility. In turn, the sense that these moments aren’t merely bad luck, or even simple sloppiness on the ball, is heightened – rather, these are moments where Gerrard’s consciously-adopted attitude partially causes them. To take Suarez example: the reason he needlessly adopted a central defender’s position against Uruguay was because his extreme attitude, that of bearing extreme responsibility, dictated he do so. Indeed, the word ‘error’ to describe them seems almost redundant in light of this; for during these ‘errors’, Gerrard is not simply making mistakes; he is self-destructing.

If this seems like faux-psychology gone mad, and perhaps it is for all we can truly get inside Gerrard’s mind, one should nevertheless notice how in the minutes after these implosive moments, Gerrard merely serves to dig himself deeper into the mire. In Sao Paulo yesterday, it was almost painful to watch the Hollywood passes on show; Gerrard seemingly forcing upon himself sole responsibility for England’s fightback where it was almost as if – once he had served to assist Suarez’s second goal – being the captain just wasn’t responsibility enough. To talk of footballers having ‘ability’ is usually only to talk of technical ability. But, as Dr Steve Peters will have known all too well, behind all successful passes and shots lies the correct psychological attitude. Of course, just to be seen to play the forced, rushed Hollywood passes that litter Gerrard’s big-game game is still strong evidence in support of Ferguson’s “not top, top” chop. Yet lurking under visible footballing inability is inner psychological inability, and Ferguson could hardly be better placed to fully acknowledge this. Hence, just as with Gerrard’s very big-game failings, it seems fair to conclude there is more to Ferguson’s “not top, top” chop than, strictly speaking, meets the eye. For what really renders Ferguson’s criticism accurate – and what really calls into question Gerrard’s status among England’s greats – is what goes on behind Gerrard’s eyes.

CW, 20/6/14

• Why Steven Gerrard is a self-destructive player.
• What defines Jose Mourinho’s identity,  and why it is not defensiveness.
• The potential impact of Brazil’s defeat at the World Cup,  and what it might mean for the country as a whole.
• Teleology and football – why 2014=1978, and why we are entering an era of footballing collectivism.
• A redefinition of the passer, creator, destroyer construct.
• How Chelsea and Barcelona will play this season.
• The historical (and even the literary) significance of Holland’s 5-1 World Cup thrashing of Spain.
• Modernity and football – which players define the way football is now played, and who is emblematic of the way players are now developed?
• Football,  commercialism and fear.

If there are any topics you want to see covered, feel free to post below.  For any suggestions on how to cover the above,  also feel free to post below. We’re open to writing on just about any topic relating to football – the more imaginative, the better. Get posting!

1.   Discuss the most relevant matches and issues of recent and forthcoming weeks.

2.   Debate and discuss specific meta-issues within the footballing world. By “meta-issue”, we don’t mean issues to do with specific matches or specific periods of time as such, but rather, issues which concern football more generally. For example, one meta-issue we could discuss is the extent to which statistical analysis can, and should, be employed by football managers. This discussion should involve outlining what the issue is,  debating what makes it problematic (or perhaps not), and then looking at possible implications, connections, contradictions and solutions that arise from the issue. Regarding this particular issue, some possible implications are: can all aspects of football be conceived in statistical terms, without reference to events on the pitch? Does the employment of statistics lead to excessive concern with numerical minutiae, at the expense of other, markedly different managerial qualities such as man management? Should statistical analysis dictate transfer policy to a greater extent than it currently does? Should it even serve as the primary tool for deciding on player purchases (as is suggested by the authors of The Numbers Game)? And so on.

3.   Approach everything we discuss with a keen analytical eye, viewing football through the prism of different intellectual disciplines to find new and interesting approaches, methods and ways of thinking about it.

4.   Provide entertaining listening!

Our first podcast should be out by mid-September – we’re hoping you enjoy all podcasts as a listener, and support us by giving us a play!